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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
NO 15-CV-1478 (JFB) (GRB)
_____________________
BELLAVIA BLATT & CROSSETT, P.C.,
PLAINTIFF,
VERSUS

KEL & PARTNERS LLC D/B/A KEL & PARTNERS & KEL KELLY,
DEFENDANTS.
___________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 16, 2015
___________________

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

to conduct any discovery on that issue or
submit any evidence. For the reasons set forth
below, defendants’ motion is granted in its
entirety and the case is dismissed.

Plaintiff Bellavia Blatt & Crossett, P.C.
(“plaintiff”) brings this action in diversity
against defendants Kel & Partners LLC d/b/a
Kel & Partners and Kel Kelly (“Kelly”)
(collectively, “defendants”), asserting a
claim of defamation under New York state
common law. Specifically, plaintiff alleges
that defendants defamed plaintiff by posting
a comment to an Automotive News webpage.

I.

BACKGROUND
A. Facts

For purposes of the motion for summary
judgment, the Court has taken the facts
described below from the complaint
(“Compl.”) and from the exhibits submitted
in connection with the pending motion.
Upon consideration of a motion for summary
judgment, the Court construes the facts in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party. See Capobianco v. City of
N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s
cause of action for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). At oral argument, this
Court notified the parties that it was
converting the motion to dismiss to a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment to consider
certain evidence from the internet site
submitted by defendants. Plaintiff’s counsel
advised the Court that plaintiff did not wish

Plaintiff is a law firm that represents
franchised or licensed automobile and marine
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dealerships in an assortment of legal matters.
(Compl. ¶ 7.) Defendant Kel & Partners LLC
is a public relations firm and defendant Kel
Kelly is a manager of the firm. (Compl. ¶¶
12-13.) TrueCar, Inc. is a corporation that
assists consumers in purchasing automobiles.
(Compl. ¶ 14.) Kel & Partners was retained
by TrueCar to provide public relations
services. (Compl. ¶ 16.)

others. Word of the street is they have
been attempting to induce dealers to
join this lawsuit for quite some time
with the misleading promise of
millions in reward. Additionally what
is being whispered throughout the auto
industry is that participating dealers
must pay thousands of dollars to
participate and the claims are just a
fishing exercise. . . .

On or about March 9, 2015, plaintiff, on
behalf of 117 of its automotive dealership
clients, commenced a lawsuit against
TrueCar in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
entitled Dependable Sales and Services, Inc.
et al v. True Car, Inc., 15-CV-1742 (“True
Car lawsuit”). (Compl. ¶ 20.) The True Car
lawsuit asserted claims for, inter alia, false
advertising and unfair competition under
federal and state law. (Compl. ¶ 21.)

(Compl. ¶ 25.)
Others replied to Kelly’s post, both
positively and negatively, and individuals
voiced a variety of opinions regarding the
automotive industry and the lawsuit, among
other topics. (Ex. A, at 6-21.)
B. Procedural History
On March 20, 2015, plaintiff filed the
instant action. Defendants filed their motion
to dismiss on August 3, 2015. Plaintiff filed
its response on October 2, 2015, and
defendants filed their reply on October 23,
2015. Oral argument was held on November
9, 2015.

On or about March 9, 2015, the date that
the True Car lawsuit was filed, an industry
publication entitled Automotive News posted
an article describing and summarizing the
lawsuit. (Compl. ¶ 23.) At the bottom of the
article, Automotive News wrote: “Have an
opinion about this story? Click here to submit
a Letter to the Editor, and we may publish it
in print. Or submit an online comment
below.” (Def.’s Mem. Ex. A, Article and
Comment Thread, at 6.) At the time that the
motion was filed, 117 comments were
submitted online in response to the story.
(Id.) On March 10, 2015, Kelly posted the
following comment:

Defendants’ submissions on the motion
to dismiss attached several exhibits including
the entire Automotive News article and
accompanying comment thread.
In its
opposition brief, plaintiff argued that “[t]he
statements of other posters may not be
considered by the Court in the context of this
motion to dismiss, and should be
disregarded.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 10.) In response,
defendants cited several cases, including
Brahms v. Carver, 33 F. Supp. 3d 192
(E.D.N.Y. 2014), for the proposition that
“courts deciding motions to dismiss based on
statements made in Internet debates routinely
examine the comments made by non-party
participants in that debate.” (Def.’s Reply at
7.) The Court agrees with defendants that “[a]
court may consider on a Rule 12(b) motion,

It is sadly becoming true that in order
to be genuinely successful in modern
business you must, at some point,
become the target of fraudulent
litigation. It’s a reality that anyone in
America can sue for any reason. The
law firm behind this suit has a
reputation for making a living by
opportunistically attempting to sue
2
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in addition to the pleading itself, documents
that are annexed to or referenced in the
complaint [and] documents that the plaintiff
relied on in bringing suit.” Brahms, 33 F.
Supp. 3d at 197 (citing Chambers v. Time
Warner, 282 F.3d 147, 152-153 (2d Cir.
2002)); see also Holowecki v. Fed. Express
Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 565-66 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“‘[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to
the complaint or incorporate by reference a
[document] upon which it solely relies and
which is integral to the complaint, the court
may nevertheless take the document into
consideration in deciding the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, without converting the
proceeding to one for summary judgment.’”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Int'l
Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)). However,
in an abundance of caution, at oral argument,
the Court gave plaintiff notice that it was
converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgement under Rule
56 so that the Court could consider the
context and surrounding circumstances of the
Automotive News website in analyzing the
defamation claim.

conversion from the Rule 12(b)(6) to the Rule
56 procedure, is likely to facilitate the
disposition of the action.’” (quoting 5C
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1366
(3d ed. 2004))). If the Court decides to
convert the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment, the non-moving
party must be given a “reasonable
opportunity to meet facts outside the
pleadings.” In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770
F.2d 288, 295 (2d Cir. 1985).
At oral argument, after notifying the
parties that it was converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary
judgement, plaintiff was given the
opportunity to introduce evidence and/or
undertake limited discovery on the issue,
such as taking a deposition regarding the
authenticity of the Automotive News website
postings; plaintiff declined to do so on the
record at oral argument. The Court has fully
considered the parties’ submissions.
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

When materials are submitted on a
motion to dismiss that are outside of the
pleadings, the Court has discretion to either
exclude these materials or convert the motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. See Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2003); see
also Carione v. United States, 368 F. Supp.
2d 186, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Federal
courts have ‘complete discretion to determine
whether or not to accept the submission of
any material beyond the pleadings’ offered in
conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and
thus complete discretion in determining
whether to convert the motion to one for
summary judgment; ‘this discretion generally
will be exercised on the basis of the district
court’s determination of whether or not the
proffered material, and the resulting

The standard for summary judgment is
well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion
for summary judgment only if “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Gonzalez v. City of
Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.
2013). The moving party bears the burden of
showing that he is entitled to summary
judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396
F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). “A party asserting
that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed
must support the assertion by: (A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record,
including
depositions,
documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
3
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particulars’” showing that a trial is needed.
R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751
F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC v.
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33
(2d Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, it is insufficient
for a party opposing summary judgment
“‘merely to assert a conclusion without
supplying supporting arguments or facts.’”
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace &
Co.-Conn., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Research Automation Corp., 585
F.2d at 33).

or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or (B) showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
The court “‘is not to weigh the evidence but
is instead required to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment, to draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party, and to
eschew credibility assessments.’” Amnesty
Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113,
122 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Weyant v. Okst,
101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996)); see
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986) (summary judgment is
unwarranted if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party”).

B. Application
An action for defamation that is expressed
in writing or print is the common law cause
of action of libel. See Church of Scientology
Int'l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir.
2001). The elements of libel under New York
law are: (1) a false and defamatory statement
of fact concerning the plaintiff; (2) that was
published by the defendant to a third party;
(3) due to the defendant’s negligence (or
actual malice, depending on the status of the
person libeled); and (4) special damages or
“per se actionability.” Celle v. Filipino
Reporter Enters., 209 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir.
2000).

Once the moving party has met its
burden, the opposing party “‘must do more
than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts . . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come
forward with specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.’” Caldarola v.
Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002)
(alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)). As the
Supreme Court stated in Anderson, “[i]f the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment
may be granted.” 477 U.S. at 249-50
(citations omitted). Indeed, “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties alone will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis
in original). Thus, the nonmoving party may
not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or
denials but must set forth “‘concrete

As the Second Circuit has repeatedly
confirmed, “New York law absolutely
protects statements of pure opinion, such that
they can never be defamatory.” Kirch v.
Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 402 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Defendants argue that the
challenged statements are opinions, not
susceptible of defamatory meaning. As set
forth below, the Court agrees with defendants
and finds as a matter of law that Kelly’s
statements were nonactionable opinions.
“Categorizing a defendant’s statements as
either fact or opinion . . . is often not an easy
task. As one commentator has noted, ‘No
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area of modern libel law can be murkier than
the cavernous depths of this inquiry.’” Levin
v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Sanford, Libel and Privacy § 5.1
(Supp. 1997)). Nevertheless, the “burden
rests with the plaintiff to establish that in the
context of the entire communication a
disputed statement is not protected opinion.”
Celle, 209 F.3d at 179.

which the complained-of assertions were
made.”); see also Dworin, 2008 WL 508019,
at *4 (“‘[I]n distinguishing between
actionable
factual
assertions
and
nonactionable opinion, the courts must
consider the content of the communication as
a whole, as well as its tone and apparent
purpose.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 51 (N.Y.
1995)).

“As an initial matter, the inquiry into
whether a statement should be viewed as one
of fact or one of opinion must be made from
the perspective of an ordinary reader of the
statement.” Mr. Chow of N.Y. v. Ste. Jour
Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see
also Dworin v. Deutsch, No. 06 Civ. 13265
(PKC), 2008 WL 508019, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2008) (“The question is one of law
for the court and one which must be answered
on the basis of what the average person
hearing or reading the communication would
take it to mean.”) (citation and quotation
marks omitted); Whitney Info. Network, Inc.
v. Weiss, No. 06-CV-6569, 2008 WL 731024,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2008) (“The
dispositive inquiry in this regard is whether a
reasonable listener . . . could have concluded
that [the defendant] was conveying facts
about the plaintiff.”) (alteration in original)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).

In particular, although the Second Circuit
has emphasized that courts should “eschew
any attempt . . . to reduce the problem of
distinguishing fact from opinion to a rigid set
of criteria which can be universally applied,”
Celle, 209 F.3d at 179 (citation and quotation
marks omitted); see also Jewell v. N.Y. Post,
23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(“Application of these three factors is not
rigid and mechanical, and no single factor is
dispositive.”), the Second Circuit has set
forth the following factors to guide the
Court’s inquiry:
(1) an assessment of whether the
specific language in issue has a precise
meaning which is readily understood or
whether it is indefinite and ambiguous;
(2) a determination of whether the
statement is capable of being
objectively characterized as true or
false; (3) an examination of the full
context of the communication in which
the statement appears; and (4) a
consideration of the broader social
context or setting surrounding the
communication including the existence
of any applicable customs or
conventions which might signal to
readers or listeners that what is being
read or heard is likely to be opinion.

Moreover, the Second Circuit has
emphasized that courts should not consider
the statement in question in isolation, but
must analyze statements “in the context of the
entire communication
and
of the
circumstances in which they were . . . written.
. . .” Celle, 209 F.3d at 178 (quoting
Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 288
(N.Y. 1986)); see also Flamm v. Am. Assoc.
of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir.
2000) (“Since Steinhilber, the Court of
Appeals of New York has consistently
focused its analysis on the overall context in

Kirch, 449 F.3d at 403 n.7 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
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In applying these factors in various
contexts, the Second Circuit and district
courts therein have further noted certain
specific characteristics that distinguish fact
from opinion. One such distinction relates to
certain rhetorical “indicators” that the writer
or speaker is expressing an opinion. For
instance, “the use of ‘appeared to be,’ ‘might
well be,’ ‘could well happen,’ and ‘should
be’ . . . signal presumptions and predictions
rather than facts.” Flamm, 201 F.3d at 154
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see
also Levin, 119 F.3d at 197 (“When the
defendant’s statements, read in context, are
readily understood as conjecture, hypothesis,
or speculation, this signals the reader that
what is said is opinion, and not fact.”);
Dworin, 2008 WL 508019, at *5 (“Deutsch
gives numerous indicators – e.g., ‘it seemed
to me . . . ,’ ‘he didn’t seem . . . ’ – which
signal to readers . . . that what is being read .
. . is likely to be opinion, not fact.”) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Similarly, “an
opinion may be offered with such excessive
language that a reasonable audience may not
fairly conclude that the opinion has any basis
in fact,” such as the “type of speech often
characterized as rhetorical hyperbole,
parody, loose, or figurative.” Treppel v.
Biovail Corp., No. 03 Civ. 3002, 2004 WL
2339759, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2004)
(citation and quotation marks omitted)
(collecting cases).

Vengroff v. Coyle, 647 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that “given
the use of the words ‘apparently,’ ‘rumored,’
and ‘reportedly’ in the letter, a reasonable
reader would understand the statements made
about the plaintiffs ‘as mere allegations to be
investigated rather than as facts’”) (quoting
Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 53 (N.Y.
1995) (emphasis in original)).
Although plaintiff argues Kelly’s use of
the word “fraudulent” conveys that it “was
being offered as a fact,” (Pl.’s Opp. at 7-8),
as defendants note, courts have found that use
of the word “fraud” can be offered as a
statement of opinion rather than as a factual
declaration. See 600 W. 115th St. Corp, 80
N.Y.2d at 143 (finding statement that “the
lease and proposition . . . is as fraudulent as
you can get and it smells of bribery and
corruption” would be understood as opinion
given defendant’s choice of “colloquial and
loose terms ‘smells of’ and ‘fraudulent as you
can get’” as well as overall nature of remarks
made at the hearing); Silvercorp Metals Inc.
v. Anthion Mgmt. LLC, 959 N.Y.S.2d 92,
2012 WL 3569952, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012) (finding accusation of “massive
accounting fraud” would be understood as
opinion where letter indicates it is an
expression of the author’s belief and that the
author was self-interested); Penn Warranty
Corp v. DiGiovanni, 810 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (finding allegations of
fraud were opinion where the context of the
website made clear that defendant was a
“disgruntled consumer and that his
statements reflect his personal opinion based
upon his personal dealing with plaintiff”); cf.
Trustco Bank of New York v. Capital
Newspaper Div. of Hearst Corp., 624
N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(finding that use of the word extortion was
not actionable because “[d]epending on the
context in which it is used, such an accusation
can be understood as mere rhetorical

Examining the specific language used in
this case makes clear that Kelly’s statements
were rhetorical opinions rather than facts.
Kelly’s statement is full of qualifiers – such
as “reputation,” “word of the street” and
“whispered” – which make clear that her
statement is one of opinion. See 600 W. 115th
St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 143
(N.Y. 1992) (finding use of “colloquial and
loose term[ ] ‘smells of’ . . . by its nature
conveys to listeners that [the defendant] has
no hard facts, only generalized suspicions”);
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that readers “give less credence to allegedly
defamatory remarks published on the Internet
than to similar remarks made in other
contexts”); Brahams v. Carter, 33 F. Supp.
3d 192, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding
statement was nonactionable opinion where it
was “made on an internet forum where
people typically solicit and express
opinions”); Biro v. Conde Nast, No. 11-CV4442 JPO, 2014 WL 4851901, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (noting that
determination that plaintiff failed to state a
defamation claim was “buttressed by the
context of the publications in question: an
online website that was essentially a blog”);
Versaci v. Richie, 815 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding statement
made on “Internet public message board,
which, as characterized even by plaintiff, is a
forum where people air concerns about any
matter” was opinion). Like the circumstances
in Sandals, Brahams, Biro, and Versaci, here,
Kelly made statements in an internet
comment section in response to an article that
invited readers to post their comments if they
had an opinion about the story, (see Ex. A, at
6), further supporting the notion that Kelly’s
statements were ones of opinion.1

hyperbole or a vigorous epithet, which is not
actionable”) (citation and quotation marks
omitted); Konig v. CSC Holdings, LLC, 977
N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(finding that “given the context in which the
challenged statements were made, on an
Internet blog during a sharply contested
election, a reasonable reader would have
believed that the generalized reference to
‘downright criminal actions’ in a post entitled
‘Would You Buy A Used Car From These
Men?’ was merely conveying opinion, and
was not a factual accusation of criminal
conduct”). Similarly, here, the surrounding
circumstances, such as the qualifiers
throughout Kelly’s statement, make clear that
use of the word “fraudulent” conveys Kelly’s
opinion.
Further, “[i]n addition to considering the
immediate context in which the disputed
words appear, the courts are required to take
into consideration the larger context in which
the statements were published, including the
nature of the particular forum.” Brian, 87
N.Y.2d at 51. New York courts have
consistently protected statements made in
online forums as statements of opinion rather
than fact. See, e.g., Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd.
v. Google, Inc., 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 415-16
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (noting that “[t]he
culture of Internet communications, as
distinct from that of print media such as
newspapers and magazines, has been
characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style” and

Obviously, these aforementioned cases do
not stand for the proposition that no
comments posted on an online forum can
ever be found to be defamatory. If the
comments were based on undisclosed facts,
such comments could certainly be
defamatory. See Steinhiber v. Alphonse, 68

1

Additionally, to the extent that the online forum at
the end of the article is considered an electronic
version of a letter to the editor because it was prompted
as an alterative to submitting a formal Letter to the
Editor, (see Ex. A, at 6), courts have routinely
protected statements made in letters to the editor or
opinion portions of a news source as nonactionable
opinions. See, e.g., Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 53 (“[T]he
common expectation is that the columns and articles
published on a newspaper’s Op Ed sections will
represent the viewpoints of their authors and, as such,

contain
considerable
hyperbole,
speculation,
diversified forms of expression and opinion. Thus, the
‘broader context’ in which [the article] was published
provided some signals to the reader that its contents
were expressions of opinion.”); Immuno AG. v. MoorJankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 253 (N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he
common expectation of a letter to the editor is not that
it will serve as a vehicle for the rigorous and
comprehensive presentation of factual matter but as
one principally for the expression of individual
opinion.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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N.Y.2d 283, 289 (N.Y. 1986) (“When,
however, the statement of opinion implies
that it is based upon facts which justify the
opinion but are unknown to those reading or
hearing it, it is a ‘mixed opinion’ and is
actionable.”) However, to the extent that
plaintiff argues that Kelly’s comments were
based on undisclosed facts, the posting itself
does not bear that out. Although Kelly does
not specifically confine her comments to
responding to information disclosed in the
Automotive News article, she makes clear that
any alternative basis for her comments is
founded in rumor. She writes that “[t]he
lawfirm behind this suit has a reputation for
making a living by opportunistically
attempting to sue others”; “[w]ord of the
street is they have been attempting to induce
dealers to join this suit for quite some time
with the misleading promise of millions in
reward”; and “what is being whispered
throughout the auto industry is that
participating dealers must pay thousands of
dollars to participate and the claims are just a
fishing exercise.” (Ex. A, at 13) (emphases
added). No reasonable reader would
understand Kelly’s claims to be based on
undisclosed facts when she makes clear that
they are based on rumors. See Vengroff, 647
N.Y.S.2d at 531 (finding that reasonable
reader would understand use of the words
“apparently,” “rumored,” and “reportedly”
rendered the statements “‘mere allegations to
be investigated rather than as facts’”)
(quoting Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 53 (emphasis in
original)); Varrenti v. Gannett Co., Inc., 929
N.Y.S.2d 671, 677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)
(finding comments were nonactionable
opinions where they were “based on rumors
that the anonymous posters heard around [the
town]”). Accordingly, because Kelly’s
statements were made on an online forum
where individuals are expected to express
opinions and she made clear that her
comments were merely stating her opinions,
a reasonable reader would understand Kelly’s

comments as allegations or opinions rather
than comments based on undisclosed facts.
Additionally, the context of the forum
where the statements were made confirms
that the readers understood the comments
posted to be opinions. The comments were
prompted by Automotive News website,
which stated at the end of the article: “Have
an opinion about this story? Click here to
submit a Letter to the Editor, and we may
publish it in print. Or submit an online
comment below.” (Ex. A, at 6.) (emphasis
added). Further, the nature of the comments
posted by other participants indicates that the
contributors understood the language posted
to be opinions. See, e.g., id. at 21 (“[I]n my
opinion, you are spot on”); id. at 20 (“The
whole idea [of the forum] is to encourage
opinions without fear of retribution.”); id. at
18 (“While I respect your opinion and might
take your good counsel . . . .”).
Moreover,
where
circumstances
surrounding an allegedly defamatory
statement indicate that the person making the
statement has a special interest in the matter,
courts have routinely held that a reasonable
observer would understand such a statement
to be one of opinion, rather than fact. See
Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 53 (holding statements in
article were nonactionable opinion where
author disclosed that he had been the attorney
for a company at issue “thereby signaling that
he was not a disinterested observer”);
Silvercorp Metals Inc., 2012 WL 3569952, at
*9 (“The documents themselves reveal the
disclosure of the author’s self interest . . . .
Such motive . . . indicates to the reader that
the author is expressing his opinion.”) In
connection
with
Kelly’s
allegedly
defamatory
post,
other
individuals
challenged her comments and claimed that
she was biased due to her past work for
TrueCar. See Ex. A, at 13 (“It seems clear that
you, Kel Kelly, work for TrueCar.”); id. at 14

8
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(“[Y]ou confessed below to being TrueCar’s
PR firm . . . ‘I love companies who elevate an
industry . . .’ or did you mean ‘elevate my
bank account.’”) Such comments pointing
out that readers were aware of Kelly’s selfinterest further establish that her comments
were understood as opinions, not fact.

Michael Tremonte and Erica Wolff of Sher
Tremonte LLP, 80 Broad Street, 13th Floor,
New York, NY 10004.

Accordingly, because the specific
language used and the context of the online
forum where the statements were posted
make clear that Kelly’s statements were
opinions rather than statements of fact, they
are not actionable and thus, summary
judgment must be granted for defendants.2

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
grants defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The Clerk of the Court shall enter
judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.

________________________
JOSEPH F. BIANCO
United States District Judge
Dated:

December 16, 2015
Central Islip, NY

***
Plaintiff is represented by Shaun Malone of
Bellavia Blatt & Crossett, P.C., 200 Old
Country Road, Suite 400, Mineola, NY
11501. Defendants are represented by
2

Because the Court has determined that the statements
at issue are nonactionable opinion, it need not consider
defendants’ alternative arguments that plaintiff is a
limited purpose public figure and has failed to

plausibly allege that defendants acted with actual
malice, or that the complaint fails to state a claim
against defendant Kel & Partners.
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